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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

MARK E. CHILD,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 950070-CA
Priority No. 2

:

INTRODUCTION
Defendant/Appellant Mark E. Child relies on his opening
brief and also refers this Court to that brief for the statements
of jurisdiction, the issues, the case, the facts, and the summary
of the argument.

Appellant replies to the State's answer to his

opening brief as follows.

ARGUMENT
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
ORDERING RESTITUTION IN THE AMOUNT OF $45,443.
Although the State claims that Appellant failed to
marshal the evidence in this case, it fails to articulate the
precise evidence it believes was not marshaled.1
1

While the

Where the State claims a defendant has not adequately
marshaled the evidence, in fairness, this Court ought to require
the State to outline the precise evidence it believes was not
included. While in many cases, a party may be able to find an item
not included in the marshaled evidence, the marshaling requirement
is not aimed at requiring the party opposing the ruling to include
an exhaustive list and extensive argument supporting the ruling.
Rather, the requirement is designed to inform this Court as to the
evidence supporting the ruling so that this Court may more readily
ascertain whether the ruling was erroneous. Where the State makes
a general assertion of failure to marshal, a defendant may feel
compelled to repeat the State's evidence which is already outlined
in Appellant's opening brief to establish that the marshaling

State certainly argued the evidence in support of the order at
greater length, Appellant nevertheless adequately met the
marshaling requirement by explicitly outlining the State's
evidence.

A review of Appellant's opening brief establishes that

Appellant cited the following evidence in support of the order.
"In August 1991, Roger Ashment, the owner of Star
Steel, hired Mark Child as the office manager for
Star Steel. R. 295, 304. In that capacity,
Child wrote payroll checks for all employees,
managed the books, paid vendors, made purchases
of materials and bid for jobs, and handled taxes.
R. 198,304."
Appellant's opening brief at 3.
"Mr. Sherwood, the auditor, came up with a figure
of $47,843.48. R. 196." . . . "He . . . compiled
figures based on what he believed to be excess
payroll, excess automobile allowance, checks made
out to Child, checks made out to cash and signed
by Child, and what Sherwood termed 'unauthorized'
checks. R. 167, 169-73."
Appellant's opening brief at 7.
After vendors contacted Ashment, Ashment found
discrepancies in the payment of vendors. "As a
result of these discrepancies, in approximately
January 1993, Ashment hired Thomas Sherwood, a
Certified Public Accountant, to conduct an audit
or review of the records of Star Steel." R. 164.
Appellant's brief at 3.

requirement was met. This requires an additional expenditure of
resources and puts a defendant in the position of yet again
outlining the State's evidence. Rather than affirming based on a
general assertion that the party challenging the order failed to
marshal the evidence, this Court should require the party seeking
to benefit from the marshaling requirement to state the evidence it
believes was not marshaled. The challenging party then would be in
a position to discuss whether such evidence was indeed omitted and,
if so, the importance of any such oversight.
2

Sherwood "testified that he found Child was
overpaid as follows: 1991 payroll $452.14
(R. 169), and automobile allowance $818.00
(R. 16 9-70). Sherwood found checks in the amount
of $16,425 made out to Child. R. 170. Sherwood
also found checks made out to cash and signed by
Child in the amount of $8,328.50 (R. 171). He
found other checks which he claimed were
unauthorized totalling $18,525.34. R. 171.
Those checks were made out to cash, Mark Child or
a utility which Sherwood testified had nothing to
do with Star Steel. R. 173. Another set of
checks totalled $1,900.00. R. 173. The total of
all these checks was $47,843.45."
Appellant's opening brief at 3-4.
Appellant also pointed out that the State submitted a
letter from Mr. Sherwood which indicates that $13,745 should not
be credited Mr. Child because those cash deposits "'were traced
through bank statements and have proved to be deposits made
through other Star Steel accounts.'"
at 9 quoting Sherwood letter.

Appellant's opening brief

In addition, Appellant included a

copy of the letter in Addendum B to his opening brief.
Although Appellant did not use the term "marshal," a
review of his brief demonstrates that Appellant adequately
marshaled the evidence supporting the trial judge's restitution
order.
In civil cases, the prevailing party must prove actual
loss with a "reasonable certainty."
P.2d 1161, 1166 (Utah 1983).

Cook Assoc, v. Warnick, 664

A reasonable certainty exists where

"there is sufficient evidence to enable the trier of fact to make
a reasonable approximation."

Id. at 1166.

At the very least,

this standard of proof should apply in criminal cases.

Appellant

contends that the State failed to establish with reasonable
3

certainty that the amount of restitution ordered in this case
reflected the actual loss sustained by the company.
Although Appellant has only a high school diploma, he was
responsible for the accounting in this company which made
thousands of dollars in purchases and paid thousands of dollars
in payroll each month.

R. 428.

disorganized and "slipshod."

The bookkeeping and records were

Defense counsel pointed out:

And I think, Judge, that what's happened here is
that there are purchases that quite, that can't
quite be solidified through invoices, although
nobody has taken the time to look through all the
invoices to add them up to make sure that all the
numbers correspond and correlate together, and
because there was a debt due to the IRS and who
else, Mr. Child is expected to be responsible for
the entire amount.
He's admitted responsibility for an amount,
Judge, but he's not admitting responsibility for
the entire amount.
R. 428-29.

Child maintains that in this case, where all of

invoices and checks were not "solidified," the State did not
establish to a reasonable certainty that the company sustained
$45,443 in damages.
The State contends that " [a]s part of his plea bargain,
defendant agreed to pay full restitution.
brief at 24.

R. 430."

State's

The cited transcript page reflects, however, that

the trial judge found that the defendant was required to make
full restitution as part of his plea bargain and sentence.
Indeed, the trial judge stated in part at R. 430:
It'll be the finding of the court that the
defendant is obligated, under the plea bargain,
and under the sentencing order of this court, to
make full restitution in an amount to be
4

determined by the court after having heard
testimony.
R. 430.
Appellant acknowledged that he was responsible for
restitution in the amount of $3,250 but maintained that he was
not responsible for the "entire amount" of loss sustained by the
company.

R. 429-3 0.

CONCLUSION
Appellant Child respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the restitution order and remand this case for a new
hearing on the restitution issue.
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day of May, 1996.
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